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INTRODUCTION

In the Fall 1998 edition of the Radcliff Quarterly, journalist and
attorney Wendy Kaminer announced that "[f]ree speech has been
the latest casualty of the abortion wars, suffering attacks from left
and right."! She described situations where activist groups pushed
for laws or pursued claims that would effectively squash the speech
activities of their opponents. 2 In her view, these actions set a dan
gerous precedent because they infringe upon "our right to conduct
public debates about abortion (and other controversial matters), to
engage in political advocacy, and to organize against whatever we
regard as immoral or unjust."3 What Ms. Kaminer did not address,
and possibly was not aware of, is that one of the biggest challenges
to the First Amendment rights of abortion activists was just around
the corner.
In the same year that Ms. Kaminer wrote about the abortion
war's encroachment on free speech rights, the Florida legislature
passed its "choose-life" specialty license plate bil1. 4 The bill pro
vided for the manufacture, sale, and distribution of specialty license
plate tags featuring the "choose-life" motto. It also set out a plan
for the proceeds of the tags to be distributed to organizations that
provide adoption services. Florida did not allow those funds to go
to agencies "involved or associated with abortion activities" that of
fer abortion or abortion as a choice. 5 Subsequently, pro-life organi
zations began to campaign for the implementation of "choose-life"
1. Wendy Kaminer, Public Rights and Responsibilities: The Practical Importance
of Free Speech, RADCLIFF QUARTERLY (Fall, 1998), available at www.radcliffe.eduJ
quarterly /199803/page32.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2004).
2. !d.
3. Id.
4. See FLA. STAT. ch. 320.08058, § 30 (2002). The "choose-life" specialty license
plate bill was the creation of Randy Harris, the County Commissioner of Marion, Flor
ida. The idea was to create a specialty license plate in which the proceeds would go
toward the funding and education of women "in crisis pregnancies who would commit
to having their babies and placing them for adoption rather than opting for abortion."
Choose Life, Inc., About Us, at www.choose-life.orglstory.html (last visited Mar. 1,
2004).
5. See FLA. STAT. ch. 320.08058, § 30.
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specialty plate programs around the United States. 6 Responding to
this legislative activity, both pro-choice organizations and individual
pro-choice citizens brought various First Amendment challenges to
these statutes. 7 In these cases, the primary dilemma for the courts
is the lack of consensus on whether these complaints should even
be allowed through the courthouse gate; that is, whether the plain
tiffs have standing to sue. 8 This Note analyzes these "choose-life"
specialty plate cases and focuses on one of the core legal issues re
garding a party's standing to sue: whether individual citizens have
standing to challenge the constitutionality of a legislature's issuance
of a specialty plate which expresses the legislature's view on a hotly
contested issue, the abortion rights debate, on the grounds that it
constitutes viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 9
6. Currently, "choose-life" specialty license plates are available in eight states: Ala
bama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Maryland, Mississippi, and Oklahoma.
In some states the specific legislation provides for a "choose-life" plate. This type of
legislation is the focus of this note. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN.§§ 27-15-3901-3908
(2003), FLA. STAT.ch. 320.08058 (2002), MISS. CODE ANN.§ 27-19-56.70 (2003), OKLA.
STAT. tit. 47, § 1136 (2003). In other states, "choose-life" plates are obtained via legisla
tion that allows any non-profit group to obtain the production and sale of specialty
plates via an existing statute or regulation if they meet pre-existing criteria. See, e.g.,
HAW. REV. STAT. § 249-9.3 (2003); MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. I §§ 12-104(b), 13-619
(2003). Two state legislatures passed specific "choose-life" specialty plate legislation
that was found unconstitutional by the courts. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:463.61 (West
1999), S.c. CODE ANN. § 56-3-8910 (Law. Co-op. 2002). In addition, many other states
have specific "choose-life" specialty plate legislation in the pipeline. See, e.g., H.B. 630,
147th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2003); H.B. 129, 125th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2003); H.B. 54,
187th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2003); H.B. 688, 103d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2003).
7. Women's Emergency Network v. Bush, 323 F.3d 937, 945-46 (11th Cir. 2003)
(affirming the holdings of two Southern District of Florida decisions, Women's Emer
gency Network v. Dickinson, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (S.D. Fla. 2002) and Women's Emer
gency Network v. Bush, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1316 (S.D. Fla. 2002), which held individuals
and organizations lacked standing to bring challenge to Florida's "choose-life" specialty
plate statute and that individual citizen's claims are not ripe for review because citizens
have not applied for plate); Henderson v. Stalder, 287 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 537 U.S. 1048 (2002), vacated and superceded by No. 00-31171,2003 WL 151183
(5th Cir. 2003), on remand by 265 F. Supp. 2d 699 (E.D. La. 2003) (various plaintiffs
challenge Louisiana's "choose-life" specialty plate statute and Fifth Circuit holds that
they lack standing); Henderson v. Stalder, 265 F. Supp. 2d 699 (E.D. La. 2003) (dis
missing challenge to Louisiana's "choose-life" specialty plate statute based on lack of
standing); Planned Parenthood v. Rose, 236 F. Supp. 2d 564 (D.S.C. 2002) (South Caro
lina "choose-life" plate act declared impermissible viewpoint discrimination and held
unconstitutional); Hildreth v. Dickinson, No. 99-583-CIV-J-21-A, 1999 WL 33603028
(M.D. Fla. 1999) (granting alternate motion for summary judgment on theory that
plaintiff's claim that Florida "choose-life" specialty plate statute violated First and
Fourteenth Amendments on the grounds that standing did not exist).
8. Id.
9. The courts entertaining "choose-life" specialty plate lawsuits hold that plain
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To accomplish its purpose, this Note discusses the Supreme
Court's present articulation of the constitutional requirement of
standing and its application to the "choose-life" standing cases.
Thus, Part I of this Note provides a general commentary on the
Supreme Court's current articulation of the standing doctrine and
describes the constitutional requirements of standing as well as pru
dential considerations. Additionally, Part I gives a general back
ground of the overbreadth and prior restraint doctrines of First
Amendment cases. Part II of the Note discusses the "choose-life"
specialty plate statutes and the three cases of the "choose-life" li
cense plate saga, Henderson v. Stalder 10 (hereinafter Henderson I),
Women's Emergency Network v. Bush l l (hereinafter Bush), and
South Carolina Planned Parenthood Network v. Rose 12 (hereinafter
Rose). Part III builds on the foundation laid in the previous parts
of the Note, paying particular attention to the two main theories
expressed in the opinions that lend themselves to polar opposite
holdings on the standing issue. Part IV provides an analysis of both
these main theories. I assert that both analyses incorrectly charac
terize the injury that individual pro-choice plaintiffs claim they suf
fer as a result of "choose-life" specialty plate legislation and, thus,
the theories constitute faulty standing analysis. Furthermore, I
maintain that when standing is argued to exist in these cases, the
tiffs lacked organizational and taxpayer standing based on additional Establishment
Clause, Free Speech, and Fourteenth Amendment claims; however, these claims and
decisions are not the focus of this Note. See Dickenson, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 1313-14
(discussing taxpayer and organizational standing); Henderson, 287 F.3d at 379-82 (for a
discussion on taxpayer and organizational standing in the case); Rose, 236 F. Supp. 2d at
566 (recognizing that plaintiffs launched individual as well as organizational challenges
based on both the Fourteenth and First Amendments). See generally Jeremy T. Berry,
Note, Licensing a Choice: "Choose Life" Specialty License Plates and their Constitu
tional Implications, 51 EMORY L.J. 1605 (2002) (providing a brief commentary on those
issues); Sarah E. Hurst, Note, A One Way Street to Unconstitutionality: The "Choose
Life" Specialty License Plate, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 957 (2003) (for a discussion on the viabil
ity of the Establishment Clause claims in the "choose-life" specialty plate cases).
10. Henderson, 287 F.3d at 374. In the July 2003 remand the plaintiff applied for,
and was denied, a "choose-choice" specialty plate as directed by the Fifth Circuit in
January 2003. Henderson v. Stalder, 265 F. Supp. 2d 699 (E.D. La. Jul. 8, 2003). She
filed a new complaint, this time challenging the entire specialty plate program, not just
the "choose-life" specialty plate statute that was the issue of the Fifth Circuit's original
holding. Id. Standing was granted and the entire specialty plate program was declared
unconstitutional on these grounds. Id. This Note involves discussion of the original
Fifth Circuit decision from 2002. See Henderson, 287 F.3d at 374. See also infra text
accompanying notes 73-85 (providing an in-depth discussion of the Henderson
chronology).
11. Bush, 323 F.3d at 937.
12. Rose, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 564
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"pro-standing" position inappropriately fashions standing by analo
gizing these novel cases to cases that concern prior restraint injuries
or injuries that result from punitive government actions. Finally,
Part V goes on to demonstrate that the facts of these cases fit
squarely within the requirements of what the Second Circuit has
termed "Competitive Advocate Standing"13 in equal protection
cases. Therefore, I urge federal courts to expand this model of
standing to encompass free speech claims, such as the claims
presented in the "choose-life" specialty plate cases, where a nar
rowly defined law works to create a free speech benefit for a politi
cal group that injures the ability of its political adversary to
compete within a specific arena.
I.

THE STANDING DOGrRINE IN FREE SPEECH CASES

At their most basic level, the "choose-life" specialty plate cases
ask whether an individual plaintiff has made a claim worthy of be
ing heard in a federal court. Not only is this question important
because the answer provides finality about whether litigation will
occur for the parties involved, but the answer also either narrows or
broadens the range of cases that federal courts will entertain. Be
cause the implications of the "choose-life" specialty plate cases14
are far-reaching, it is important to layout the foundation of stand
ing jurisprudence in the free speech context in order to appreciate
fully the issues addressed in the cases.
A.

The Standing Doctrine Generally

Article III of the United States Constitution circumscribes the
authority of the federal judiciary by confining its power to include
only the determination of actual "cases" and "controversies."15
Federal courts have developed various doctrines under this Article
13. See, e.g., Ctr. for Reprod. Law and Policy v. Bush, 304 F.3d 183, 197 (2nd Cir.
2002) (holding that pro-choice plaintiffs have standing to challenge Standard Clause
that prohibits "[foreign NGOs] from collaborating with Plaintiffs, [thereby] den[ying]
Plaintiffs the opportunity to compete on an equal footing with opponents of abortion
law reform."); In Re Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1028-29 (2nd Cir. 1989)
("competitive advocate standing" is a kind of an injury "involve[ing] a determination
that ... as a competitor a plaintiff ... personally competes in the same arena with the
party to whom the government has bestowed the assertedly illegal benefit."); New Alli
ance Party v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 858 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (crite
ria for competitive advocate standing not met by plaintiff).
14. See supra note 7 (listing the various cases involving challenges to "choose
life" statutes).
15. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, d. 1.

2004)

THE "CHOOSE-LIFE" SPECIALTY PLATE CASES

173

III power, such as mootness, standing, ripeness, and political ques
tion,16 to answer whether a "case or controversy" exists that entitles
a plaintiff to federal court jurisdictionP The doctrine of standing is
inferred from Article lIps to ensure that the federal judiciary does
not render decisions that violate separation of powers principles 19
and to ensure the "exercise of [] power by a federal court" is not
simply "gratuitous."2o The standing doctrine achieves these goals
by enveloping both a constitutional requirement and prudential
limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.21 Once raised, how
ever, it becomes clear that standing is an "amorphous doctrine"22
and the existing case law provides little direction for any new stand
ing inquiry.23
The Supreme Court currently utilizes the three-pronged test
articulated in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife 24 to determine whether
16. E.g., Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1178-79 (C.A.D.C. 1984) (Bork, J.,
concurring), quoted with approval in Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984).
All of the doctrines that cluster about Article III - not only standing but moot
ness, ripeness, political question, and the like - relate in part, and in different
though overlapping ways, to an idea, which is more than an intuition but less
than a rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitutional and prudential
limits to the powers of an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of
government.
Id.
17. E.g., Valley Forge Christian ColI. v. Am. United for the Separation of Church
and State, 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982). See also Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. V. Scheidler, 10
U.S. 249, 255 (1994) (noting jurisdictional issues can be raised at any time for any rea
son whatsoever).
18. See, e.g., Lujan V. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992) (discuss
ing that although Article III simply requires a plaintiff's complaint to be a "case" or
"controversy," certain elements must form a determination of "case" or "controversy").
19. Allen, 468 U.S. at 752.
20. Simon V. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976) (stating that ab
sent a showing that plaintiff has suffered an individualized injury "likely to be redressed
by a favorable decision," standing "would be gratuitous" as opposed to consistent with
Article III).
21. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 750.
22. Flast V. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) (citing Hearings on S. 2097 Before the
Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 465, 467-68 (1966) (statement of Prof. Paul A. Freund)).
23. Numerous law review articles are critical of standing. See generally William
A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE. L.J. 221 (1988); Gene R. Nichol, Jr.,
Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen V. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 635 (1985) [here
inafter Nichol I); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury Anal
ysis, 82 B.U. L. REV. 301 (2002) [hereinafter Nichol II); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is
Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Informational
Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 613
(1999).
24. Lujan V. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). In the seminal
case in which the Supreme Court articulated the current standing requirement, environ
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the constitutional requirement of standing has been met. 25 This test
asserts that at "its irreducible constitutional minimum"26 a party
seeking jurisdiction in a federal court has the burden of showing: 1)
some actual or threatened injury; 2) that can be traced to the chal
lenged action of the defendant, and 3) that is likely to be redressed
by a favorable decision. 27 Thus, this test includes the three ele
ments of injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability, each of which
has its own independent criteria. 28 Furthermore, Lujan makes
clear that standing is "an indispensable part of the plaintiff's case"29
and that at each stage of litigation the elements of standing must be
supported the same way that the elements of any other matter in
litigation would need to be supported. 30
The first requirement of standing, injury-in-fact, demands that
a plaintiff must suffer "an invasion of a legally protected interest
which is (a) concrete and particularized, (b) and actual or immi
nent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.' "31 This means that al
though an individual's claimed injury might be merely an
"identifiable trifie,"32 a party seeking review must still be adversely
affected or aggrieved by a defendant's actions. 33 Moreover, so long
mental groups brought an action against the Secretary of the Interior challenging a
regulation that required other agencies to confer with the secretary under the Endan
gered Species Act regarding federally funded projects in the United States or the high
seas. Id. On certiorari, the Supreme Court, Scalia, J., held that the plaintiffs lacked
standing on the basis that 1) the claimed injury was not sufficiently imminent and 2) and
the injury was not redressable. ld. at 568-78.
25. ld. at 560-61.
26. ld. at 590 (Blackmun, J. dissenting) (referring to the irreducible minimum
requirements of standing).
27. ld. at 560-61 (citations omitted).
28. ld.
29. ld. at 561.
30. See id. (indicating that at the pleading stage general allegations of alleged
injury suffice because on a motion to dismiss the court presumes that the general allega
tions of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct are true and that on a motion for
summary judgment specific facts must be set forth by plaintiff in order to show stand
ing). See also Ny\care Health Plans, Inc. v. Aetna, 301 F.3d 329, 334-35 (5th Cir. 2002)
(explaining that although the Supreme Court has not articulated the standard to be
applied when a federal court raises the issue of standing sua sponte, it seems that the
principles of fairness and notice to the parties should require that the standard be the
same as when the plaintiff filed the claim).
31. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155
(1990».
32. U.S. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669,
690 (1973).
33. ld. at 690 n.14 (rejecting the argument that standing should be limited to
when a person is "significantly affected" by an action of an agency, and reiterating that
"'[i]njury in fact' reflects the statutory requirement that a person be 'adversely affected'
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as the injury is particular to that individual the court cannot deny
standing "simply because many people suffer the same injury."34
Causation, the second requirement of standing, necessitates
that the alleged injury is "fairly traceable" to the challenged action
of the defendant and not the result of independent action of some
third party not before the court. 35 Scientific certainty that the de
fendant's actions caused the precise harm suffered by the plaintiff is
not needed to meet the causation element. 36 Rather, the plaintiff
must only establish that there exists a "substantial likelihood" that
the defendant's conduct caused the plaintiff's harm.37
The final constitutional requirement of standing is redres
sability. Redressability requires that it "is likely, as opposed to
merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision."38 However, the case law is not clear as to what consti
tutes "likely" as opposed to "speculative" redress. 39
Furthermore, Lujan makes clear that when the suit is a consti
or 'aggrieved,' ... [thus,] it distinguish[es] a person with a direct stake in the outcome of
a litigation - even though small- from a person with a mere interest in the problem.").
See also Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 698
F.2d 1098, 1102-03 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that in cases involving Establishment
Clause claims, the motive for a plaintiff to bring a lawsuit may be partly spiritual or
value-laden; however, to have standing and a day in court the plaiJ"ltiff must demon
strate a particularized injury).
34. See Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. at 686-88
(asserting that standing cannot be denied to appellees because the claimed "harm to
their use and enjoyment of the natural resources of the Washington area," was in fact a
harm suffered by all those who use the resources).
35. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561-62 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976».
36. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d
149, 161 (4th Cir. 2000) (noting fairly traceable requirement is not equivalent to that
required in a tort claim); Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Termi
nals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 72 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding plaintiffs do not need to show "to a
scientific certainty that defendant's effluent, and defendant's effluent alone, caused the
precise harm suffered by the plaintiffs"). But see Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co., 73
F.3d 546, 558 (5th Cir. 1996) (utilizing a tort theory of contribution to determine "fairly
traceable" prong of standing); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Texaco Ref. & Mktg.,
Inc., 2 F.3d 493, 505 (3d Cir. 1993) (articulating a standard for "fairly traceable" that
imitates a tort theory of contribution).
37. See, e.g., Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc., 913 F.2d at 72 (quoting Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 75 n.20 (1978».
38. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
39. Compare id. at 571 (holding it was speculative whether redress would flow
from a positive determination because court could not be certain that the claimed injury
would stop if the government administrative agency conformed to the role it was re
quired to take in statute), with Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir. 1994)
(deciding standing is not defeated simply because an agency might take an adverse ac
tion if finding for plaintiff requires agency to take an action).
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tutional challenge to the legality of government action or inaction
"the nature and extent of facts that must be averred . . . or
proved ... in order to establish standing depends considerably upon
whether the plaintiff is himself an object of the action or forgone
action at issue."4o If the plaintiff is the object of the action, courts
are usually quick to hold that the action or inaction has caused the
plaintiff's alleged injury and "that a judgment preventing or requir
ing the action will redress it."41 Conversely, although the plaintiff's
claim is not precluded when he or she is not the object of the gov
ernment action or inaction challenged, standing in these cases is
"substantially more difficult to establish."42
In addition to the constitutional requirements of standing ad
dressed above, federal courts also consider prudential interests. 43
Prudential considerations federal courts take into account when
making standing determinations include the general prohibition
against one litigant raising another person's legal rights,44 the rule
barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately
addressed in the representative branches,45 and the requirement
40. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
41. Id. at 561-62.
42. Id. at 562. Lujan articulated that when a plaintiffs asserted injury arises from
the government's allegedly unlawful regulation or lack of regulation of someone else
(such as an agency), causation and redress ability usually turn on the response of the
regulated or regulable third party to the government action or inaction. Id. It becomes
the burden of the plaintiff to adduce facts showing that those choices have been or will
be made in such manner as to produce causation and permit redressability of injury. Id.
However, Lujan did not address what causation and redressablility would turn on in a
case where the plaintiff's asserted injury arose from the government's grant of a benefit
to someone else - the situation confronted in the "choose-life" specialty plate cases.
43. John C. Reitz, Standing to Raise Constitutional Issues, 50 AM. J. COMPo L. 437,
439-43 (2002) (discussing the sources of the standing rules, including prudential consid
erations). Reitz's article discusses the sources of the standing doctrine, including the
history of prudential considerations. He states, "for most of its history, the Court has
emphasized primarily 'prudential' bases for standing - that is, the Court has claimed
that the standing limitations result chiefly from the Court's own voluntary policy of self
restraint for various reasons. Only in the last three decades has the separation of pow
ers argument emerged as the chief foundation of the standing rules." Id. at 442 (cita
tion omitted).
44. Valley Forge Christian ColI. V. Am. United for the Separation of Church and
State, 453 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982). See also Singleton V. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-14
(1976) (stating that the reason for the prohibition on third party standing includes the
fact that courts should not adjudicate third party rights unnecessarily or "it may be that
in fact that the holders of those rights either do not wish to assert them, or will be able
to enjoy them regardless of whether the in-court litigant is successful or not").
45. Valley Forge Christian Coli., 453 U.S. at 474. See also Ryan Guilds, A Juris
prudence of Doubt: Generalized Grievances as a Limitation to Federal Court Access, 74
N.C. L. REV. 1863, 1888 (1986). Although Guilds points out that courts are uncertain
whether to treat the standing prohibition against generalized grievances as a constitu

2004]

THE "CHOOSE-LIFE" SPECIALTY PLATE CASES

177

that a plaintiff's complaint fall within the "zone of interests" pro
tected by the law invoked. 46 However, because prudential consid
erations are not a required part of standing, federal courts have
much more flexibility in their application. 47 Thus, in the interest of
justice, courts will often relax these requirements. 48
B.

The Role of Overbreadth and Prior Restraint in Standing
Cases

In free speech cases, the doctrine of overbreadth was devel
oped to aid litigants in establishing standing in instances when an
overly broad law threatens to deny the litigant free speech protec
tions secured by the First Amendment. 49 However, considerable
debate exists over when exactly the doctrine of overbreadth applies
in a particular case. Some federal courts treat it as a relaxation of
the ordinary standing elements. 50 Other federal courts treat over
breadth as a relaxation of only the injury-in-fact element of stand
tional or prudential consideration, they are clear that the prohibition involves consider
ations about separation of powers principles and the prohibition against the court
giving advisory opinions. Id.
46. Valley Forge Christian Coil., 453 U.S. at 475.
47. Id. at 471-72. See also Reitz, supra note 43, at 442.
All U.S.-American doctrines of justiciability are permeated by a strong sense
that the courts must exercise self-restraint in exercising their powers of judicial
review in order to temper inevitable conflicts with the other branches of gov
ernment. No doubt this attitude springs at least in major part from the fact
that the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly provide for judicial review and
the courts have therefore thought it important to defend their claim of that
power by trying to avoid overplaying their hand. Because the prudential tests
for standing are not required by the Constitution, they have not been applied
with much rigor. They are often not mentioned in the Court's opinions on
standing. Moreover, they overlap to some extent with the constitutional re
quirements. For example, strict application of the personal injury test should
rule out most generalized grievances, but as the Court has been willing to rec
ognize intangible harms, some of which are widely shared, it has had to aban
don the policy against general grievances in many cases. In order to facilitate
judicial review at the behest of private litigants, the Court has recognized
many third-party claims in violation of the prudential policy against them.
Id. (footnote omitted).
48. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193 (1976) (noting that "our decisions
have settled that limitations on a litigant's assertion of jus tertii ... stem from a salutary
'rule of self-restraint ... "'); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445 (1972) (relaxing the
ability of a third party to bring constitutional challenge).
49. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (discussing the reasons for over
breadth doctrine). A facial challenge to a statute exists not only where an overly broad
statute reaches into areas of protected expression, but also where a statute is unconsti
tutional in every conceivable application. See, e.g., Members of City Council v. Taxpay
ers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 796 (1984).
50. Vincent, 466 U.S. at 796-98. See also Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1122 n.5
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ing. 51 Still other courts treat overbreadth as an additional
prudential concern that a federal court may choose to apply.52 De
spite this debate, what is clear is that overbreadth is "a judicially
created doctrine designed to prevent the chilling of protected ex
pression."53 In other words, the doctrine of overbreadth reasons
that an unconstitutional restriction on expression might stop parties
not before the court from engaging in protected speech and, there
fore, those parties would be effectively deni~d judicial review. 54
Constitutional scholar Richard H. Fallon has distilled the situa
tions in which the Supreme Court allows facial challenges on the
grounds of overbreadth. 55 First, courts allow overbreadth chal
lenges when the government has placed an obstacle or "roadblock"
in the way of expressive activity or speech in order to control what
it believes is a compelling interest. 56 Second, it applies when a state
regulates speech or expressive activity based on the belief that the
category is not constitutionally protected. 57 Third, overbreadth ap
plies when the statute's true goal is to promote state interests unre
lated to the content of speech or expressive activity, but the statute
incidentally affects speech rights. 58 Finally, it applies where a stat
(11th Cir. 1994) (noting that the overbreadth doctrine was a relaxation of standing
requirements).
51. Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 392-93 (1988). See also Z.J.
Gifts D-4, L.L.c. v. City of Littleton, 311 F.3d 1220, 1227 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that
application of overbreadth principles "does not eliminate the need for the plaintiff to
demonstrate its own cognizable injury in fact").
52. Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 581 (1989); Stanley v. Jones, 239 F.3d
769, 779 (6th Cir. 2001) (stating that rule allowing facial challenges is a prudential doc
trine rather than a constitutional right).
53. Oakes, 491 U.S. at 584 (stating, "[o]verbreadth is a judicially created doctrine
designed to prevent the chilling of protected expression. An overbroad statute is not
void ab initio, but rather voidable, subject to invalidation notwithstanding the defen
dant's unprotected conduct out of solicitude to the First Amendment rights of parties
not before the court").
54. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
n.8 (1980).
55. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 863
(1991) (explaining the four situations where overbreadth challenges appear in free
speech cases).
56. [d. at 866. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm'n V. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479
U.S. 238, 263 (1986) (recognizing the state's interests in trying to level the playing field
of speech by disallowing direct expenditure of corporate funds for elections, holding
that the Massachusetts' act creating prohibition muzzled free speech as applied).
57. Fallon, supra note 55, at 866. See, e.g., Keyishian V. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S.
589, 603-04 (1967) (holding unconstitutional overly broad New York statutes and ad
ministrative regulations that placed criminal penalties on students and school employ
ees because the penalties where "subversive").
58. Fallon, supra note 55, at 866. See, e.g., Marsh V. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501,509
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ute "fails to provide adequate safeguards against administrative im
position of constitutionally impermissible restraints."59
Another rule that applies to free speech standing issues is the
doctrine of prior restraint established in Near v. Minnesota. 60 Prin
cipally, prior restraints are "administrative and judicial orders for
bidding certain communications when issued in advance of such
time as communications are to occur."61 The prior restraint doc
trine is a prohibition that places a high presumption of invalidity on
those things that constitute a prior restraint. 62 It is derived from the
First Amendment63 which states that "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech."64
A prior restraint violation is not a trivial mistake. In Nebraska
Press Association v. Stuart,65 Justice Burger wrote, "prior restraints
on speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolera
ble infringement on First Amendment rights. Prior restraint ... has
an immediate and irreversible sanction."66 The federal courts have
recognized two different forms of prior restraints: 1) judicial injunc
tions prohibiting speech,67 and 2) burdens placed on communica
tion before the communication is made. 68 In the case of judicial
injunctions that prohibit protected speech, the court has held
"[s]ubsequent civil or criminal proceedings, rather than prior re
10 (1946) (determining unconstitutional Alabama statute aiming to protect property
rights of owners by making it a crime to enter or remain on premises after being told
not to because free speech interests have preferred statutes).
59. Fallon, supra note 55, at 866. See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealers
Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757-69 (1988) (holding unconstitutional ordinance granting
mayor the authority to grant or deny permit to place news rack on private property
because it has danger of "chilling" constitutionally protected speech).
60. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
61. Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993).
62. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 555 (2001) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(quoting New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971)) (re-affirming that
"prior restraints on speech bear 'a heavy presumption against ... constitutionality.' ");
CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315, 1318 (1994).
63. Additionally, the Court has held that the First Amendment applies to the
states as well as the federal government through the Due Process clause of the Four
teenth Amendment. E.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940).
64. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
65. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
66. Id.
67. Lawson v. Murray, 515 U.S. 1110, 1113 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring).
68. Generally, this will mean that a permit system or licensing requirement is
valid only if the discretion of the licensing official is limited to questions of times, place,
and manner, i.e. the discretion is content-neutral. See, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312
U.S. 569, 574-76 (1941). See also Kevin Francis O'Neill, A First Amendment Compass:
Navigating the Speech Clause with a Five-Step Analytical Framework, 29 Sw. U. L. REV.
223,270-78 (2000) (for a general discussion on the two forms of prior restraint).
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straints [i.e. the injunction or gag order], ordinarily are the appro
priate sanction for ... misdeeds in the First Amendment context."69
The doctrines of overbreadth and prior restraint are often used
together when determining standing in the free speech contextJ°
Specifically, courts consider overly broad laws that grant "unfet
tered discretion" in a licensing official to grant or deny licenses to
be prior restraints on speech because they "chill" the ability of a
particular speaker to speak before speech is to occur.71 One could
say that in the First Amendment context the injury of the overly
broad statute or law is the prior restraint on speech.
II.

THE "CHOOSE-LIFE" SPECIALTY PLATE
STATUTES AND CASES

The "choose-life" specialty plate legislation enacted through
out the United States is strikingly similar. The basic premise be
hind "choose-life" specialty plates legislation is threefold: 1) the
statutes allow those individual car owners desiring to disseminate
the "choose-life" message the ability to do so via the purchase and
display of a "choose-life" specialty plate, 2) the statutes guarantee
that the revenue generated from the sale of the specialty plates will
go solely toward the funding of adoption services for women in
"crisis pregnancies," and 3) the statutes specifically prohibit any
generated revenue from going to agencies that offer counseling on
abortion as a choice or abortion services.72 Before launching into
an analysis of the positions on standing contained in the "choose
life" specialty plate cases, this part focuses attention on the underly
ing statutes at issue and the substance of the opinions in the cases
that concern them. Thus, this section lays out the context necessary
to apply the aforementioned standing principles to the "choose
life" specialty plate cases.
69. CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315, 1318 (1994).
70. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 (1973) (discussing that over
breadth challenges are entertained when there is a prior restraint violation).
71. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757-59 (1988).
72. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 320.08058, § 30 (2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 47:463.61 (West 1999); S.c. CODE ANN. § 56-3-8910 (Law. Co-op. 2002). Hawaii is an
example of a state that has issued "choose-life" specialty plates through legislation that
is not specifically aimed at creating a "choose-life" plate. Under the Hawaii scheme,
any non-profit organization can apply for a specialty plate if they meet certain criteria.
The directors of finance for the counties in Hawaii approve or deny specialty plates in
accord with that statute. Therefore, although the scheme in Hawaii and states with
similar provisions might raise speech issues, it does not raise the standing issues that are
the subject of this note. HAW. REV. STAT. § 249-9.3 (2003).

2004]

A.

THE "CHOOSE-LIFE" SPECIALTY PLATE CASES

181

The Louisiana Scheme

Before the Fifth Circuit declared the entire specialty plate
scheme of Louisiana unconstitutional in the summer of 2003,73 Lou
isiana had a practice that the issuance of any specialty license plate
needed to be secured by an act of the legislature.74 One specialty
plate statute under this scheme was the Louisiana "choose-life"
specialty plate statute that required all revenue generated from the
sale of the "choose-life" specialty plates go to a fund authorized to
distribute grants to organizations meeting the statute's criteria. 75
The statute also created a "Choose-Life Advisory Council" to de
sign the license plates and make decisions about what organizations
will receive grants.76 The statute required the council's member
ship be composed of members from known pro-life organizations,
including the American Family Association, the Louisiana Family
Forum, and Concerned Women for America.77
Plaintiffs, including individual Louisiana taxpayers and
Planned Parenthood, brought a suit in August of 2000 challenging
the constitutionality of the Louisiana statute.78 This case was the
first of the three "choose-life" specialty plate cases, and although
the case was ultimately vacated with instructions that the plaintiffs
amend their complaint in order to have the substantive claim de
cided by the Eastern District of Louisiana,79 the reasoning of the
Fifth Circuit's original standing decision articulates the positions for
and against individual standing when a plaintiff alleges he or she is
injured by a particular speech benefit granted to another group.80
The plaintiffs alleged that the statute "abrogate[d] their right to
free speech, constitute[ d] an impermissible establishment of relig
73. Henderson v. Stalder, 265 F. Supp. 2d 699 (E.D. La. 2003)
74. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 47:463.7-47:463.110 (West 1999).
75. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:463.61(F)(2) (West 1999).
76. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:463.61(E) (West 1999).
77. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:463.61(E)(a-c) (West 1999). See also Henderson v.
Stalder, 287 F.3d 374, 377-78 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1048 (2002), vacated
and superceded by No. 00-31171, 2003 WL 151183 (5th Cir. 2003), on remand by 265 F.
Supp. 2d 699 (E.D. La. 2003). The web sites for these organizations also make clear
their pro-life position. See generally American Family Association Online, at www.
afa.net/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2004); Concerned Women for America Website, at www.
cwfa.orgllibrary.asp?category=life (last visited Mar. 1, 2004); Louisiana Family Forum
Website, at www.lafamilyforum.org! (last visited Mar. 1, 2004).
78. Henderson v. Stalder, 112 F. Supp. 2d 589, 595 (E.D. La. 2000), rev'd, 287
F.3d. 374 (5th Cir. 2002).
79. Henderson, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 699 (E.D. La. 2003). See supra note 7 and
accompanying text.
80. Henderson, 287 F.3d at 374.
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ion, and denie[ d] them their right to due process in violation of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitu
tion."81 The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the stat
ute is unconstitutional and an injunction against its enforcement. 82
In its original decision on appeal, the Fifth Circuit rejected all the
plaintiffs' arguments, finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing on
all grounds averred to challenge the "choose-life" specialty plates. 83
In particular, the majority held that the individual plaintiff, Keeler,
lacked standing to challenge the statute based on grounds that the
statute constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination on the
part of the legislature, because even if the court declared the statute
unconstitutional there would be no redress for her injury.84 In con
trast, the dissent argued that plaintiff Keeler had standing to chal
lenge the specialty plate statute because redress would come in the
form of "creat[ing] a level playing field for all affected by the
statute."85

B.

The Florida Scheme

In Florida, the legislature enacted the "choose-life" specialty
plate legislation pursuant to a Florida law that allows organizations
desiring a specialty license plate to request a plate after meeting
certain preliminary criteria. 86 The legislature can either grant or
deny the request. 87 Although the goals of the Florida "choose-life"
specialty plate statute are almost identical to the Louisiana goals,88
the Florida statute has a different scheme for the distribution of the
funds, though the intended beneficiaries are still non-profit pro-life
adoption organizations. 89 Under Florida's scheme, fees generated
from the sale of the specialty license plates are distributed to each
county "in the ration that the annual use fees collected by each
county bears to the total fees collected for the plates within the
state."90 To date, it has been reported that because of this program
Id. at 377. See also Henderson, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 591.
Henderson, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 592.
83. Henderson, 287 F.3d at 379-81 (stating that both the individual and the state
plaintiffs lacked standing).
84. Id. at 387.
85. Id. at 392 (Davis, J., dissenting).
86. FLA. STAT. ch. 320.08053 (2002).
87. Id.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 74-77.
89. FLA. STAT. ch. 320.08058 (2002).
90. Id. Although not central to this Note's discussion of standing, Florida's
scheme attempts a more democratic distribution than other "choose-life" specialty plate
81.

82.
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over two million dollars has been generated for Florida pro-life,
non-profit crisis-pregnancy organizations. 91
In Bush 92 , the Eleventh Circuit rejected the argument
presented by individual plaintiffs Becker and Jackson that the State
of Florida violated their First Amendment rights "by providing a
public forum for pro-life car owners to express their political views
but not providing a similar forum for pro-choice car owners. "93 In
keeping with the Henderson I decision, the Eleventh Circuit re
jected the plaintiffs' complaint on redress ability grounds. 94 The
Bush court also rejected the individual plaintiffs' arguments for
lack of a cognizable injury-in-fact. 95 In the Eleventh Circuit's view,
the plaintiffs did not claim an injury, and an injunction against the
enforcement of the Florida "choose-life" specialty plate statute
would not "in any way advance Appellant's opportunity to
speak."96
C.

The South Carolina Scheme

In South Carolina, the "choose-life" specialty plate act requires
the South Carolina Department of Public Safety to issue the spe
cialty plate to any person requesting the plate. 97 As in Louisiana
and Florida, proceeds from the funds are to be distributed to local
pro-life, non-profit agencies that provide "crisis pregnancy" prostatutes. The Florida scheme arguably strengthens the position that the speech is not
state speech. Unlike the statutes in Louisiana and South Carolina, the Florida scheme
at least makes certain that the county where the purchaser buys the plate will receive
that purchaser's proceeds.
91. Choose Life, Inc. Website, at http://www.choose-life.org!story.html(last vis
ited Mar. 1, 2004). Choose Life, Inc. describes the funds raised in Florida as follows:
"As of September 2003, over $2,000,000.00 has been raised and the tags continue to sell,
raising over $70,000.00 per month." [d.
92. Women's Emergency Network v. Bush, 323 F.3d 937 (11th Cir. 2003). In an
other Florida case challenging the Florida statute the District Court for the Middle
District of Florida granted Defendant's alternate motion for summary judgment which
dismissed plaintiff's claim that Florida "choose-life" specialty plate statute violated free
speech for lack of standing. Hildreth v. Dickinson, No. 99-583-CIV-J-21-A, 1999 WL
33603028 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 1999). This Note does not analyze this case as the Elev
enth Circuit provided the more exhaustive analysis of the same issue in Florida.
93. Bush, 323 F.3d at 942.
94. /d. at 947.
95. [d. at 946-47. In rejecting the notion that the plaintiff articulated an injury in
fact, the Eleventh Circuit held that "the state of Florida has not denied Appellants'
access to the specialty license plate forum ... [nor] rejected Appellants' application for
a specialty license plate." [d.
96.

[d.

97.

S.c. CODE ANN. § 56-3-8910 (Law. Co-op. 2002).
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grams.98 However, unlike the Florida and Louisiana statutes, the
South Carolina "choose-life" specialty plate statute is separate from
the statute authorizing other specialty plates. 99 Under South Caro
lina's pre-existing general specialty license plate statute, non-profit
organizations apply for license plates promoting their group and the
group's license plates are only available to members of the "certi
fied" organization.1°O The South Carolina "choose-life" specialty
plate program, however, was created and approved by an act of the
legislature, thereby avoiding the earlier system designed to allow
non-profit organizations to obtain permission for access to the li
cense plate forum through a legislatively authorized process. 101
In Rose, the district court was asked to determine whether the
South Carolina legislature violated the Constitution when it en
acted South Carolina's "choose-life" specialty plate statute. 102 On
cross motion for summary judgment,103 the Rose court rejected the
arguments posited by the defendant that the plaintiffs lacked stand
ing to bring the free speech claim against them. More specifically,
the Rose court affirmatively adopted Judge Davis' argument for
standing presented in Henderson 1,104 holding that in a case where
the legislative process "uncontrolled by any standards . . . al
leged[ly] selects one viewpoint over all others on a particular
topic"105 that the plaintiff may bring a facial challenge to the offen
sive statute without meeting the traditional standing require
ments. 106
III.

THE Two CENTRAL POSITIONS ON THE STANDING ISSUE

The three cases introduced above articulate the current theo
ries of standing where an individual citizen claims viewpoint dis
crimination by the government when it grants access to a speech
98. Id.
99. See Planned Parenthood v. Rose, 236 F. Supp. 2d 564, 564-66 (D.S.C. 2002)
(analyzing how the South Carolina scheme operates).
100. S.c. CODE ANN. § 56-3-8000(D) (Law. Co-op. 2002).
101. S.c. CODE ANN. § 6-3-8910 (Law. Co-op. 2002). See also Rose, 236 F. Supp.
2d at 566.
102. Rose, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 574 (declaring South Carolina "choose-life" plate
act impermissible viewpoint discrimination and therefore unconstitutional).
103. !d. at 565.
104. Id. at 568; Henderson v. Stalder, 287 F.3d 374, 387 (5th Cir. 2002) (Davis, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1048 (2002), vacated and superceded by No. 00-31171,
2003 WL 151183 (5th Cir. 2003), on remand by 265 F. Supp. 2d 699 (E.D. La. 2003).
105. Henderson, 287 F.3d at 387 (Davis, J., dissenting).
106. Rose, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 568-69.
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forum to individuals whose speech the plaintiff does not like or
agree with. This part distills the two central arguments.
A.

The Pro-Standing Side of the Debate

In his dissenting opinion in Henderson I, Judge Davis articu
lated a pro-standing position regarding individual First Amendment
standing in the "choose-life" specialty cases that was later utilized,
in part, by the Rose court. 107 According to Judge Davis' rationale,
the injury that plaintiff Keeler complained of in Henderson I is that
the "choose-life" specialty plate statute passed by the legislature
"allows for expression of the choose life message on state prestige
license plates, without allowing for the expression of the opposing
pro-choice viewpoint in the same forum. "108 Judge Davis articu
lates that it is evident from the facts of Henderson I that the Louisi
ana legislature will not pass a statute authorizing a specialty plate
with the pro-choice view.1 09 He opines that the Equal Protection
Clause and the First Amendment afford individuals the security
that the government may not grant the use of a forum to people
whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to
express less favorable or more controversial views.1 l0 He empha
sizes, "[t]here is 'equality in the field of ideas,' and government
must afford all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard."l11
According to Judge Davis, individual plaintiff Keeler's claim in
Henderson I is one that involves a free speech issue and, therefore,
the court should apply an "expanded notion of standing."112 Rely
ing on City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing CO.,113 Judge
107. Id. at 568; Henderson, 287 F.3d at 387 (Davis, J., dissenting).
108. Henderson, 287 F.3d at 387 (5th Cir. 2002) (Davis, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 387 n.l (Davis, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 387 (Davis, J., dissenting) (citing as authority Police Dep't v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972».
111. Id.(Davis, J., dissenting) (quoting Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96.
112. /d. at 388 (Davis, J., dissenting). See also Rose, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 568-70
(discussing how it agrees that an expanded notion of standing applies in this type of
case and also viewing the cases cited by Judge Davis as dispositive).
113. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988). Plain
Dealer Publishing challenged a Lakewood city ordinance that authorized the mayor to
grant or deny the applications of publishers who sought permission to place newspaper
racks on public property. Id. The ordinance required Lakewood's mayor to give an
explanation if he denied a permit, but, by the terms of the ordinance he could operate
within whatever "terms and conditions" he "deemed necessary and reasonable." Id. at
754. The Supreme Court held that the Lakewood ordinance was facially invalid be
cause the mayor had "unfettered" discretion to discriminate in granting permits based
on the content of a publisher's publications or the viewpoints of those publications. Id.
at 764. Moreover, the Court held that this kind of discretion encouraged publishers to
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Davis reasons that a facial challenge to a licensing law should be
brought whenever a party is subject to a law that "vests unbridled
discretion" in a governmental official or agency to permit or deny a
license based on content or viewpoint and "the law has a close
nexus to expression."114 He states that although in most instances
the discretionary power to grant or deny a license is given to a gov
ernment actor under the statute, he sees "no reason why the princi
ple should not be applied [to the facts of Henderson 1]."115 The fact
that the legislature makes the decision to grant or deny a license is
not distinguishable from the current case law that allows facial chal
lenges where the discretionary agent is one that was granted its
power from the legislature. 116
Furthermore, Judge Davis reasons that it is irrelevant whether
a specific statute creates Louisiana's specialty license plate pro
gram. 117 He cites Neimotko v. Maryland 118 in support of his argu
ment that an unfair policy and practice can emerge where
"unfettered discretion" is the standard for granting a license in vio
lation of the Constitution.1 19
Judge Davis further argues that under traditional analysis
Keeler would have standing because the majority was mistaken in
its framing of her injury and in its conclusion that her claim does
not request a redressable remedyPO Comparing Orr v. Orr121 and
censor their publications or to "play nice" with the mayor in order to obtain approval of
their licensing requests. Id. The Court opined that cities can require licensing of news
racks on public property and reasonable restrictions on that license. !d. However, it
made clear that cities cannot make obtaining a license subject to the unchecked discre
tion of one public official. Id.
114. Henderson, 287 F.3d at 388 (Davis, J., dissenting) (citing Lakewood, 486
U.S. at 755-56).
115. Id. (Davis, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 389 (Davis, J., dissenting) (citing Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394
U.S. 147 (1969».
117. Id. at 389 (Davis, J., dissenting).
118. Neimotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951). A group's application to a city
council for permits to use a city park for Bible talks was denied, for no apparent reason
except the city council's disdain or disagreement with the group's opinions. Id. at 272.
Subsequently, the group members were convicted on charges of disorderly conduct for
having public speeches and meetings without a permit. Id. at 270. There was no evi
dence of disorder, violence, threat of violence or riot. Id. at 271. Also, there was no
official ordinance that regulated the park's use, just a practice that developed whereby
permits had to be obtained by the park commissioner and city council. Id. at 269. The
Supreme Court allowed the facial challenge to go forward. Id. at 273.
119. Henderson, 287 F.3d at 389 (Davis, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 390 (Davis, J., dissenting). Although the Rose court clearly agrees
with Judge Davis' dissent that an expanded notion of standing allows for a facial chal
lenge to the "choose-life" plate statute, the district court in Rose also favorably cited
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Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland 122 to the facts in Hender
son I, Judge Davis concludes that when a law grants a privilege re
lated to speech to a select group it is really just "manipulating the
playing field for speech" and placing "a burden on the free speech
rights of [the plaintiff]. "123 When this happens, removal of the dis
criminatory program redresses the injury because it simply "creates
a level playing field."124 This is consistent with Orr and Ragland,
he maintains, because in those cases redress came in the form of
removing the unconstitutional benefit from the beneficiary rather
than granting the unconstitutionally denied benefit to the
plaintiff. 125
Moreover, Judge Davis states that the "choose-life" statute is
like the sales tax exemption in Ragland that grants a speech privi
lege to a select group of individuals. 126 He claims that in Henderson
and referenced Judge Davis' analysis of standing if the "traditional elements" of stand
ing are applied and the redressability prong is at issue. Planned Parenthood v. Rose,
236 F. Supp. 2d 564, 568 (D.S.C. 2002).
121. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268-272 (1979). In Orr, an Alabama statute granted a
benefit to wives or recently divorced women by excluding them from having to pay
alimony to their husbands or ex-husbands. ld. at 270. One ex-husband challenged the
statute on equal protection grounds. ld. at 271. The Supreme Court declared the stat
ute unconstitutional reasoning that the statute was not substantially related to the goal
of helping needy spouses or reducing the historical disparity between women and men
that is caused by discrimination against women. ld. at 282-83.
122. 481 U.S. 221 (1987). Arkansas imposed a tax on receipts from the sale of
tangible personal property, but exempted, among other things, newspapers and "relig
ious, professional, trade, and sports journals and/or publications printed and published
within this State." ld. at 224. A publisher of a general interest magazine that included
articles on subjects, including religion and sports, brought suit arguing that the tax ex
emption violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. ld. at 225. The publishers
sought a refund of the sales taxes it had paid since 1982. ld. The major force of the
publisher's argument was that subjecting its magazine to the sales tax, while sales of
newspapers and other magazines were exempt, imposed a free speech penalty on the
publisher. ld. at 226. The Supreme Court held that the publisher had standing to chal
lenge the Arkansas sales tax scheme. ld. Moreover, the Court rejected the argument
that the publisher did not assert a redressable injury because the publisher did not pub
lish a newspaper or a religious, professional, trade, or sports journal. [d. at 227. In the
Court's view, underinclusive statutes would be isolated from constitutional challenge if
the plaintiffs challenge were denied. ld. at 233. See also Henderson, 287 F.3d at 391
(Davis, J., dissenting). According to Judge Davis, the state in Ragland argued that de
claring the statute invalid would afford the appellant no relief because it would deny the
exemption to those the statute was designed to benefit; it would not remove the offen
sive tax on the appellant. ld. The Supreme Court, he points out, rejected that reason
ing in Ragland because "such a proposition would effectively insulate under inclusive
statutes from constitutional challenge." ld.
123. Henderson, 287 F.3d at 391 (Davis, J., dissenting).
124. ld. at 392.
125. ld. at 391.
126. ld.
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I, as in Orr and Ragland, it is "immaterial" whether the individual
plaintiff would derive a benefit if her claim were successful because
"this constitutional attack holds the only promise of escape from
the burden on her free speech rights that derive from the chal
lenged statute."127

B.

The No-Standing Side of the Debate

The no-standing position in the debate was first articulated in
Henderson I and later solidified in the Bush decision. 128 There are
two basic theories to this contention that are addressed in turn. The
first position is that individual plaintiffs lack standing to sue be
cause the injury complained of-the inability to express one's pro
choice view within a state created license plate forum-could not
be redressed by a remedy that sought to declare the statute uncon
stitutional.1 29 According to this view, declaring the statute uncon
stitutional cannot redress the injury because it does not grant access
to the speech forum and only prohibits the speech of others.130 The
other position involves the injury-in-fact prong of standing.B I Ac
cording to this theory, the plaintiffs have not alleged an injury-in
fact because they have not applied for and subsequently been de
nied a specialty plate. 132 Because of this, the position holds, the
state cannot be alleged to have denied plaintiffs a speech benefit. 133
In her concurring opinion in Henderson I, Judge Jones man
ages to provide the most exhaustive articulation of the "no-stand
ing" position on redressibility. In that opinion, she reiterates the
Supreme Court's current enunciation of the elements used to deter
mine standing: that at its "irreducible minimum" standing requires
a plaintiff to show that he or she has "suffered an injury in fact,"
that "the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant's actions," and
the injury "will likely be redressed by a favorable decision."134 In
response to the plaintiff's challenge in Henderson I that sought a
preliminary injunction, she states in language later adopted by the
Eleventh Circuit that "even if the Choose-Life statute is declared
127. Id. at 392.
128. Women's Emergency Network v. Bush, 323 F.3d 937 (11th Cir. 2003).
129. Henderson, 287 F.3d at 381; Bush, 323 F.3d at 947.
130. Bush, 323 F.3d at 947.
131. Id. at 946-47.
132. Id. at 947.
133. Id.
134. Henderson, 287 F.3d at 378 (Jones, J., concurring) (quoting Pub. Citizen, Inc.
v. Bomer, 274 F.3d 212, 217 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992))).
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unconstitutional, [the plaintiff's] complained of injury would not be
redressed as that remedy will not provide [plaintiff] a forum in
which to express her pro-choice view."135 In other words, Judge
Jones claims that free speech jurisprudence traditionally holds the
remedy for a speaker's unjust exclusion from a forum is to admit
the speaker.136 She opines that an injunction that would require the
removal of pro-life speakers runs contrary to the law of free speech
because it censors those speakers and does nothing to provide a
forum for the plaintiff who has complained of an injury-in-fact in
the form of viewpoint discrimination by government officials. 137
Judge Jones' concurring opinion, however, does more than
state her position's rationale for why standing does not exist in the
"choose-life" specialty plate context. She uses her platform to scru
tinize directly Judge Davis' dissent in Henderson I, and, by implica
tion, the position later articulated in Rose.138 For example, she
questions the use of Orr v. Orr 139 and Arkansas Writers' Project,
Inc. v. Ragland 140 as precedent for the pro-standing position. She
maintains that although these two cases involve parties that claimed
injuries resulting from the grant of a statutory benefit to others,
they are distinguishable because declaring the statute unconstitu
tional in both these cases only presented the "possibility" that the
plaintiff'S injuries might not be redressed,141 However, she argues
that the relief requested by the plaintiff would have "no possibility
whatsoever" of redressing the complained of injury because the
speech forum would be nixed. 142
Furthermore, she argues that the plaintiff's claim does not
135. Id. at 381. See also Bush, 323 F.3d 937 at 947 (holding that "[r]emoving pro
life speech from the forum does not in any way advance Appellants' opportunity to
speak.").
136. Henderson, 287 F.3d at 387 (Jones, J., concurring).
137. Id. See also Bush, 323 F.3d at 947. Although the Eleventh Circuit does not
maintain that the alleged injury-in-fact is cognizable, it clearly adopted the same ratio
nale as Judge Jones on the redressibility issue when it held that redress is not possible
because the requested injunction would only remove pro-life speech and do nothing to
advance the allegedly injured speech, and that redress is problematic because the First
Amendment does not require the state to provide a speech forum for speakers who
have not requested an opportunity to speak. Id.
138. Planned Parenthood v. Rose, 236 F. Supp. 2d 564 (D.S.C. 2002).
139. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 272-73 (1979). See also supra note 121.
140. Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 227 (1987). See also
supra note 122.
141. Henderson, 287 F.3d at 386 (Jones, J., concurring). For example, if in Orr
the state decided to impose the alimony requirement regardless of gender or, if in
Ragland if the state decided to tax all publishers.
142. Id.
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"hold the only promise of escape from the burden that derives from
the challenged statutes. "143 According to Judge Jones, the plaintiff
could only be in "the same position as the appellant in Orr" if she
challenged the total statutory scheme rather than this one stat
ute. 144 Thus, "[f]avorable redress could then result either in the
state's allowing her to place the pro-choice sentiments on specialty
license plates or in the state's shutting down the alleged First
Amendment forum by banning, or ceasing to sponsor, all specialty
plates."145
Judge Jones also responds to the claim of an expanded notion
of standing. She effectively declares that the claim that an ex
panded notion of standing exists is simply wrong. In her view, a
First Amendment facial challenge to a statute is not a challenge
where "[the standing] requirements of injury-in-fact, causation, and
redressability need not be met ... these requirements are not op
tional."146 The relaxation principle is a "prudential standing princi
ple"147 and really just a "species of third party standing Gus tertii),
which we have recognized as a prudential doctrine."148 In her view,
Keeler does not meet the redressability prong of standing, so the
question of whether the doctrine of overbreadth applies is
immaterial. 149
Additionally, she argues that in the Henderson I dissent Judge
Davis incorrectly applied case law to support his contention that a
relaxed standing principle should apply and override the traditional
standing requirement. lso In her view, the plaintiffs' injuries in
volved criminal convictions under laws that unconstitutionally vio
lated free speech in all but one of the cases cited by the dissent. 1Sl
143. Id. (quoting Orr 440 U.S. 268 at 273).
144. Id. See also Women's Emergency Network v. Bush, 323 F.3d 937, 947 (11th
CiT. 2003) (holding "we will not instruct the State to close the entire specialty license
plate forum because Appellants have not challenged the entire forum.")
145. Henderson, 287 F.3d at 386 (Jones, J., concurring).
146. Id. at 384.
147. ld. at 385 n.4.
148. ld. (Jones, J., concurring).
149. ld. at 384-85 (Jones, J., concurring).
150. ld. at 385 (Jones, J., concurring).
151. ld. (Jones, J., concurring). See generally Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394
U.S. 147 (1969) (reversing conviction for violating Birmingham ordinance that made it
an offense to participate in parade, precession, or public demonstration without a per
mit); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (reversing conviction for failure to
submit a film to Baltimore board of censors); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268
(1951) (reversing convictions for disorderly conduct for having bible discussion in a
public park); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (reversing conviction for loiter
ing under Alabama Act); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (reversing con
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Jones distinguishes Lakewood, the one case that did not involve
criminal sanction of a plaintiff, from Henderson I on the ground
that the "statute obstructed the publisher's First Amendment
rights" by requiring the plaintiff to pay taxes and incur an addi
tional burden that other magazines did not incur. 152 In her view,
plaintiff Keeler does not complain of an injury analogous to the one
in Lakewood because Louisiana's "choose-life" specialty plate stat
ute does not require Keeler to take an affirmative action that bur
dens her free speech.153
In Bush the Eleventh Circuit denied the plaintiffs standing to
sue on the ground that they failed to allege a cognizable injury.1 54
In a lengthy discussion, the Eleventh Circuit illustrates what it be
lieves was the tension in the plaintiff's articulation of the injury.
Describing how it believed the Fifth Circuit had difficulty defining
the precise injury in Henderson I, the Eleventh Circuit held that
framing the injury as "the government's promotion of one side of
the debate on the abortion rights issue in a speech forum, coupled
with the lack of opportunity to present their opposing view" is an
articulation that "presumes the state has done more than it actually
has done."155 In their view, although the state has granted a speech
forum to persons who desire a "choose-life" plate, it has not denied
the forum to those with contrary views. 156 The Eleventh Circuit
rejected the plaintiffs' argument that they were denied access to the
forum when the legislature rejected an amendment to the act that
would have implemented a choose-choice specialty plate because
there was "no clear evidence that the legislature intended to ex
clude pro-choice groups from the specialty license plate forum by
rejecting the amendment."157 The court viewed that evidence as
indicating only that the legislature chose not to prefer the plaintiff's
speech by allowing them to circumvent the requirements of the li
censing scheme by getting an amendment rather than having to file
pursuant to Florida law. I58 Thus, under the holding of Bush, until a
plaintiff has applied for and been denied a plate, the plaintiff lacks
standing because he or she has not suffered the requisite injury in
viction under city ordinance for distributing religious pamphlet and magazine without a
permit).
152. Henderson, 287 F.3d at 385 n.5 (Jones, J., concurring).
153. See id. at 385 (Jones, J., concurring).
154. Women's Emergency Network v. Bush, 323 F.3d 937, 946-47 (11th Cir. 2003).
155. Id. at 946.
156. !d.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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fact. 159
IV.

How

THE "CHOOSE-LIFE" SPECIALTY LICENSE PLATE

CASES INCORRECTLY FRAMED THE ISSUE

A.

Critique of the No-Standing Position

On the no-standing side of the debate, the underlying analysis
argues that even if there is an injury, a favorable decision is not
likely to redress the injury of which the individual pro-choice plain
tiff complains. 160 However, it is precisely because of the way they
frame the issue that the advocates of the no-standing theory reach
this outcome. In other words, if the only injury complained of is the
inability to obtain a pro-choice plate, and all the "choose-life" spe
cialty plate statutes do is grant access to a plate forum to another
individual, then it is difficult to see how a favorable decision would
redress the plaintiff's grievance. 161 Conceptualizing an individual
plaintiff's injury in this way makes declaring a choose-life specialty
plate statute unconstitutional seem more like a penalty on the pro
life speaker than a remedy for the plaintiff.1 62 In fact, it was fram
ing the injury this way that led the Eleventh Circuit to declare that
not only was the injury irredressable, but that there was no cogniza
ble injury at all. A plaintiff simply cannot be injured if he or she
has not even sought access to a forum to which someone else has
been granted access. 163
However, the problem with this conceptualization of the injury
is that it ignores the pro-choice plaintiffs' claim of viewpoint dis
crimination on the part of the state legislature.1 64 Viewpoint dis
159. Id.
160. Henderson v. Stalder, 287 F.3d 374, 384 (5th Cir. 2002) (Davis, J., dissent
ing), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1048 (2002), vacated and superceded by No. 00-31171, 2003
WL 151183 (5th Cir. 2003), on remand by 265 F. Supp. 2d 699 (E.D. La. 2003).
161. See Nichol II, supra note 23, at 323-24 (providing an illustrative example to
explain that what constitutes an injury is value-laden).
162. See Henderson, 287 F.3d at 387 (Jones, J., concurring) (providing Judge
Jones' discussion on how Judge Davis' acceptance of the plaintiff's injury would result
in the removal of free speech for the pro-life view and do nothing for defendant). See
also Bush, 323 F.3d at 946-47 (explaining how this does nothing to provide a speech
forum for plaintiff).
163. Bush, 323 F.3d at 946-47.
164. Brief for Appellant-Plaintiffs at 2, Henderson v. Stalder, 287 F.3d 374 (5th
Cir. 2002) (No. 02-13981-J), available at 2002 WL 32174297. See also Nichol II, supra
note 23, at 338-40 (arguing that "[t]he injury inquiry should embrace a significant pre
sumption in favor of the plaintiff's claim of harm" and that doing this would provide
consistency in a currently inconsistent standing inquiry). In Bush the Eleventh Circuit
dealt with this issue by claiming that the plaintiffs assume too much when they claim the
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crimination by the government is a free speech violation. 165 Once
the injury is framed as one where the legislature has participated in
viewpoint discrimination, the door to a constitutional challenge
should open because it is the injury of the viewpoint discrimination
itself which is impermissible absent a compelling justification. 166
B.

Critique of the Pro-Standing Position

Unlike the no-standing side of the debate, the pro-standing
side conceptualizes the plaintiff's injury as two-fold. The injury
both denies the plaintiff a forum and the government promotes
only one side of the abortion debate.1 67 In doing so, these pro
standing advocates attempt to arrive at standing utilizing both a re
laxed notion of standing and traditional standing analysis. Howgovernment denies them a speech benefit, because the government did not deny plain
tiffs access to the forum by rejecting an application for a plate or discriminating in the
application process. Bush, 323 F.3d at 946-47. However, this is simply a circular argu
ment. The Eleventh Circuit has artfully argued that the answer to the claim that the
plaintiffs have been denied a forum is to say they have not been denied access to a
forum. Id. This argument makes a mockery of the requirement of Lujan that federal
courts must look at standing questions in light of the stage of litigation in which defend
ants find themselves. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,561 (1992) (stating
that specific facts must be set forth to show standing at the summary judgment phase).
In a motion for summary judgment, as in Bush, where the specific facts are ones that
can be inferred to deny plaintiffs a forum, a genuine issue of material fact exists that
must be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. See Women's Emergency Network
v. Dickinson, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (laying out the standard for
summary judgment), affd, 323 F.3d 937 (11th Cir. 2003).
165. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. School, 533 U.S. 98, 120 (2001) (find
ing school's exclusion of a religious club from use of school building after school consti
tuted unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination); Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v.
Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 600 (1998) (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that it is a "fundamental
rule of the First Amendment that viewpoint discrimination in the exercise of public
authority over expressive activity is unconstitutional."); Sons of Confederate Veterans,
Inc. v. Glendening, 954 F. Supp. 1099, 1102 (D. Md. 1997) (stating that it is not permissi
ble for the government to target the particular views of a speaker on a particular subject
in order to encourage one viewpoint and prohibit or discourage another viewpoint).
166. See generally Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37
(1983). In this case a union and its members challenged the provision of a collective
bargaining agreement that granted the bargaining representative exclusive access to
teacher mailboxes and the interschool mail system to the exclusion of a rival union. Id.
at 38-39. The claimed injury was that this access policy favored a particular viewpoint
on labor relations in the Perry schools such that teachers would receive information
from one union but be denied the perspective offered by the plaintiff union. Id. at 48
49. The dissent stipulated that absent a compelling justification, viewpoint discrimina
tion was not permissible. Id. at 65-66 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
167. Henderson, 287 F.3d at 387; Planned Parenthood v. Rose, 236 F. Supp. 2d
564, 570 (D.S.C. 2002) (citing Justice Davis affirmatively, "the plaintiffs are injured by
the government's promotion of one side of the debate on the abortion rights issue in a
speech forum, coupled with the lack of opportunity to present their opposing view.").
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ever, their reasoning is flawed under present free speech
jurisprudence.
To begin with, the pro-standing argument's reliance on Lake
wood for a facial challenge is misplaced. 168 Lakewood is an appli
cation of overbreadth in a prior restraint contexU 69 In Lakewood,
the Supreme Court granted standing because in that case the stat
ute allowed the Mayor of Lakewood to grant or deny permits in
order to access newspaper racks on an "unfettered," "discre
tion[ary]" basis yo The "choose-life" specialty plate cases are dis
tinguishable because the "choose-life" statutes do not work
affirmatively to "chill" or "freeze" protected speech based on view
point before the speech happensyl In Lakewood there was con
cern that publishers would or did censor their publications in order
to get a permit to access news racks.l72 As the Eleventh Circuit
adeptly points out in Bush, the "choose-life" specialty plate statutes
only explicitly apply to individuals desiring to purchase a "choose
life" specialty piateY3 In other words, the statute only creates a
forum for pro-life speech that did not exist prior to the statute's
passage. The "choose-life" specialty plate statutes may effectively
create a speech forum for one group and not another, but they do
not potentially remove an individual plaintiff's access to a forum
that he or she previously had access. In short, the statutes do not
"chill" speech in the way we have come traditionally to expect in
free speech casesy4
Second, the attempt to find redress ability under traditional
standing analysis fails because the particular conceptualization of
the injury by the pro-standing side of the debate is not one found in
any free speech cases to date. 175 The injuries recognized in free
168. See discussion supra Part 1I1.A.
169. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988).
170. [d. at 757.
171. See discussion supra Part I.B. (discussing link between prior restraints and
the doctrine of overbreadth).
172. City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 757.
173. Women's Emergency Network v. Bush, 323 F.3d 937, 947 (11th Cir. 2003)
(distinguishing Bush from the authority plaintiffs cite).
174. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514,533,554 (2001) (noting fear of
public disclosure of a private conversation might have a "chilling effect" on free
speech); Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 871-72 (1997) (stating that
the vagueness of a content-based regulation often raises First Amendment concerns
because it can "chill" a speaker's permissible speech); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visi
tors of Univ., 515 U.S. 819,896 (1995) (funding restrictions might "chill" free speech).
175. The closest articulation of an injury paralleling those of individual plaintiffs
in the "choose-life" specialty cases is in Perry Education Association v. Perry Local
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speech cases are either prior restraints on speech or injuries caused
by a penalty that result from the allegedly unconstitutional stat
uteY6 Redress happens in those types of First Amendment cases
because it removes either the impermissible prior restraint on
speech or the penalty imposed as a result of speech. In other
words, the case law on which the pro-standing side of the debate
relies would fit if the individual plaintiffs in the "choose-life" spe
cialty plate cases complained that they were penalized under partic
ular provisions of the statutes,177 or if their speech was prevented
from ever happening.178 In other words, traditionally, when a stat
ute is declared unconstitutional the Free Speech right and the
Equal Protection right that have been denied are restored to the
plaintiffs. 179
V.

"COMPETITIVE ADVOCATE STANDING": THE KEY TO THE
COURTHOUSE GATE

The difficulty of the pro-standing positions is that they are at
tempts to find standing by utilizing cases that involve legislation di
rected at the plaintiff as opposed to directed at a third party.180 The
"choose-life" specialty plate statutes, however, are directed solely
Educators' Association where the school district's collective bargaining agreement ex
pressly excluded a rival union from accessing the email and voicemail systems of the
school district's employees. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'Ass'n, 460 U.S.
37 (1983). Standing was not an issue in that case. However, the "choose-life" specialty
plate cases are different because the statutes do not affirmatively exclude the formation
of "choose-choice" or similar plates. Compare id. with supra note 7 (the "choose-life"
specialty plate cases).
176. See discussion supra Part I.B. See also Doug Rendleman, Book Review,
Irreparability Irreparably Damaged: The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 90 MICH.
L. REv. 1642, 1664 (1992) (discussing that there is no important significance in a prior
restraint's ability to prevent speech before it happens and a known criminal penalty's
ability to chill expression before it happens because both make it clear that the speaker
is not supposed to speak).
177. For example, in Arkansas Writers' Project, the newspapers were penalized by
being taxed and redress came in the form of possibly not being taxed. Ark. Writers'
Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987). In Orr the remedy claimed was the possibility
of not having to pay alimony. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
178. For example, in Lakewood redress comes in the form of a publisher no
longer having to censor protected speech to get a permit. Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 750.
179. Henderson v. Stalder, 287 F.3d 374, 387 (5th CiT. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S.
1048 (2002), vacated and superceded by No. 00-31171, 2003 WL 151183 (5th CiT. 2003),
on remand by 265 F. Supp. 2d 699 (E.D. La. 2003).
180. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 27-15-3901-3908 (2003), and FLA. STAT.ch.
320.08058 (2002), andMIss. CODE ANN. § 27-19-56.70 (2003), and OKLA. STAT. tit. 47,
§ 1136 (2003) (providing only for the creation of a "choose-life" license plate tag), with
Ark. Writers' Project, 481 U.S. at 221 (city ordinance required all but exempt publishers
to pay a sales tax), and Orr, 440 U.S. at 270 n.1 (stating that ALA. CODE § 30 (1975)
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to benefit a particular group. There is no direct monetary or crimi
nal penalty, nor does the statute impose a heightened obligation
directly on the plaintiffs. 181 The pro-standing side of the issue sim
ply ignores that the "choose-life" specialty plate legislation involves
a novel question for free speech jurisprudence. The no-standing
side of the debate appears to understand that this is a novel issue at
some level;182 however, they incorrectly treat as settled the issue of
whether a third party could suffer an injury based on legislation
enacted to benefit another. They are also incorrect in their re
sounding denial that redress for an injury suffered by a third party
could come in the form of removing the legislatively granted benefit
from the party being benefited.
On closer examination, the pro-standing side of the debate ap
pears to be grappling with an articulation of standing that is close to
what the Second Circuit calls "competitive advocate standing"183 in
Equal Protection cases. In those cases, the plaintiff is judged to
have standing to bring an Equal Protection claim when the govern
ment's allocation of a particular benefit "creates an uneven playing
field"184 for organizations or individuals advocating views in a pub
lic arena and the "plaintiff competes in that arena with a party to
whom the government has bestowed a benefit."185 In other words,
"competitive advocate standing" exists where the plaintiff alleges
"discriminatory enforcement of a statute grants an unfair advantage
to a political competitor which thereby diminishes the plaintiffs'
ability to compete effectively in the political arena."186
Similarly, plaintiffs in "choose-life" specialty plate cases should
frame the injury in the following context: the legislature has allo
provides that husband must provide alimony to ex-wife if she is not financially able to
care for self).
181. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN.§§ 27-15-3901-3908; FLA. STAT. ch. 320.08058;
MISS. CODE ANN. § 27-19-56.70.
182. Although the no-standing position does not explicitly talk about the novelty
of these cases, it adequately distinguishes existing case law. See discussion supra Part
IILB.
183. E.g., Ctr. for Reprod. Law and Policy v. Bush, 304 F.3d 183, 186 (2nd Cir.
2002); Fulani v. Bentsen, 35 F.3d 49, 54 (2nd Cir. 1994); In Re Catholic Conference, 885
F.2d 1020, 1024 (2nd Cir. 1989).
184. Ctr. for Reprod. Law and Policy, 304 F.3d at 197. Compare id. with Hender
son, 287 F.3d at 390 (Davis, J., dissenting) (discussing redress in the form of a "level
playing field for all effected by the statute").
185. Ctr. for Reprod. Law and Policy, 304 F.3d at 197; In Re Catholic Conference,
885 F.2d at 1029.
186. Jordana G. Schwartz, Note, Standing to Challenge Tax-Exempt Status: The
Second Circuit's Competitive Political Advocate Theory, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 723, 723
(1990).
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cated a free speech benefit to pro-life individuals in the form of a
new forum for speech and, as a result, the law "creates an uneven
playing field" whereby pro-life proponents are bestowed a competi
tive advantage. Thus, the injury is that by enacting the statute the
government denies the pro-choice plaintiff the level playing field
for viewpoint that neutrality requires in a government-sponsored
public forum. The pro-choice plaintiff would meet the requirement
that he or she competes in the same arena in which the government
bestowed a benefit to pro-life perspectives because her view is a
view on the abortion debate. I87
The virtues of framing the claim in this way are numerous.
First, "competitive advocate standing" allows the plaintiff to articu
late an injury that is not derived from the "chilling" nature of an
overly broad statute or the potentially punitive vague statute.
Rather, the injury under "competitive advocate standing" comes
from precisely the kind of statutes we are dealing with here, nar
rowly constructed statutes I88 that benefit one group of favored
speakers with the intended effect of discriminating against another
group of speakers.1 89 That is, the claimed injury is that the govern
ment denies the pro-choice plaintiff access to a forum because of
his or her political views. Thus, a lack of viewpoint neutrality is
really the injury-in-fact under this analysis. Causation is met be
cause the injury is "fairly traceable" to a state legislature's enact
ment of a "choose-life" specialty plate tag. Redress is likely to
follow from a favorable decision because declaring these types of
statutes unconstitutional would "equalize the playing field of
187. See Ctr. for Reprod. Law and Policy, 304 F.3d at 189.
188. FLA. STAT. ch. 320.08058, § 30 (2002). "The department shall develop a
Choose Life license plate as provided in this section. The word 'Florida' must appear at
the bottom of the plate, and the words 'Choose Life' must appear at the top of the
plate." Id.
189. A similar theory to "competitive advocate standing" has emerged in the
D.C. Circuit. This theory allows plaintiffs to establish standing where tax exemptions
created a benefit for competitors. See, e.g., Normon Leon, The Second Circuit's Appli
cation of Standing in In Re United States Catholic Conference, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 429,
464 n.204 (1991). Additionally, [Arkansas Writers' Project,] Ark. Writers' Project v.
Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987), might be of help here because if we define the distin
guishing quality of that case to be the "competitive" nature between those publishers
granted an exemption and those denied an exemption, we have a similar situation to the
tax cases out of the D.C. Circuit. See also Henderson v. Stalder, 287 F.3d 374, 385 n.5
(5th Cir. 2002) (Jones, J., concurring), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1048 (2002), vacated and
superceded by No. 00-31171, 2003 WL 151183 (5th Cir. 2003), on remand by 265 F.
Supp. 2d 699 (E.D. La. 2003) (Judge Jones argued that Lakewood would be on point if
newspapers were rivals).
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ideas. "190 Therefore, declaring the statutes unconstitutional would
not be a speculative form of redress because there is no doubt it
would stop the constitutional violation. 191
Additionally, framing the injury by utilizing the "competitive
advocate standing model" makes it permissible to challenge the
narrow "choose-life" specialty plate statute as opposed to the entire
statutory scheme.1 92 This is because the injury, which is the demo
tion of one side of the abortion debate because of the government's
lack of viewpoint neutrality, is caused by the enactment of the
"choose-life" specialty plate legislation. The injury is not the gov
ernment's "unfettered discretion to grant or deny a specialty
plate."193 More narrowly, under this model the injury is the gov
ernment's alleged lack of viewpoint neutrality on the abortion issue.
Attacking a statute authorizing a specialty plate for something
other than an opinion on the abortion issue would not make sense
190. Some might criticize that framing this debate in terms of "competitive advo
cate standing" is problematic because it binds courts to use rational basis scrutiny be
cause rational basis was applied to all the claims that said standing existed under the
"competitive advocate standing" method. See, e.g., Ctr. for Reprod. Law and Policy,
304 F.3d at 186; Faluni v. Bentsen, 35 F.3d 49, 54 (2nd Cir. 1994); In Re Catholic Con
ference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1024 (2nd Cir. 1989). However, the difference between this case
and other cases that have employed the "competitive advocate standing" framework is
twofold. First, if treated as an Equal Protection claim, the claimed injury would be the
denial of a speech forum based on certain "fundamentally protected" speech of a per
son. It is likely that when discussing access to a forum for speech that strict scrutiny
would apply. This topic concerns more than a tax break for favored speakers. See, e.g.,
Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983). Second, there is no
reason why this articulation of standing could not directly apply to First Amendment
claims. Free speech holds a special status, and therefore courts have loosened the
standing requirement in various contexts. See discussion supra Part I.B. See also Police
Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92,96 (1972) (determining that "government may not grant
the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those
wishing to express less favored or more controversial views.").
191. The redressability prong of standing provides two options when a statute is
declared unconstitutional. First, the unconstitutional statute or law can be struck down.
Alternatively, the statute can be reformed in order to make the unconstitutional law or
statute constitutional. In the "choose-life" specialty plate cases, for example, the judges
only spoke of redress in the form of striking down the unconstitutional provision. How
ever, the plaintiffs' briefs in the Henderson line of cases clearly addressed this option as
a form of redress. Brief for Appellant-Plaintiffs at 3-7, Henderson v. Stalder, 287 F.3d
374, (5th Cir. 2002) (No. 02-13981-J), available at 2002 WL 32174297.
192. This is the course the Fifth Circuit took when it vacated Henderson and de
cided that it would entertain the case if plaintiff Keeler challenged the entire statutory
scheme. Henderson v. Stalder, No. 00-31171, 2003 WL 151183 (5th Cir. Jan. 9, 2003).
Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that this would be the only way to chal
lenge the statute in an attempt to get standing. Women's Emergency Network v. Bush,
323 F.3d 937, 947 (11th Cir. 2003).
193. Planned Parenthood v. Rose, 236 F. Supp. 2d 564, 568-70 (D.S.C. 2002).
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under this model because there is no link between those statutes
and the speech forum the plaintiff claims that the government has
granted to a political adversary.
Furthermore, "competitive advocate standing" is consistent
with the judiciary's role as a protector of the minority against the
encroachment of the legislative majority.194 For example, it is no
secret that many state legislatures have a pro-life majority of mem
bers.195 By granting a forum to pro-life speakers via a "choose-life"
specialty plate without providing a pro-choice plate, pro-life legisla
tures provide a competitive speech advantage to the pro-life side of
the debate that has immeasurable consequences on the ability of
pro-choice groups to compete on equal footing in those states. 196
As Carolene Products 197 taught, one of the functions of the judici
ary is to protect the civil rights of the minority from the
majoritarian legislative process. 198 It is troubling that when a court
denies standing in cases where the claim is that the government has
granted a speech benefit to one side of a political debate and not
the other side of that debate, as in the "choose-life" specialty plate
cases, the legislature may effectively be able to "prescribe what is
orthodox in politics."199 This is because without standing no re
194. See United States v. Carolene Prod., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1944) (stating
that for the scope of the decision there was no need to determine if "prejudice against
'discrete and insular minorities' prohibits the protection of minorities to the point
where there should be a 'more searching judicial inquiry.' ").
195. Henderson, 287 F.3d at 388 n.1 (announcing that Louisiana has declared it
self a pro-life state). See also Nat'l Abortion Rts. League, Positions of Governors and
State Legislatures on Choice, at www.naral.orgipublications!loader.cfm?url=ICommon
spoUsecurity/getfile.cfm&PageID=2193 (last visited Mar. 1, 2004). The methodology is
not scientific, but it is clear that many states have legislatures in which the majority
leans heavily pro-life or pro-choice. Id.
196. See, e.g., Int'I Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Fed. Election
Comm'n, 678 F.2d 1092, 1098 (1982) (noting union members' allegations of the "rela
tive diminution of their political voices-their influence in federal elections-as a direct
result of the discriminatory imbalance Congress is alleged to have ordered"). Similarly,
providing pro-life speakers an extra forum would reduce the voices of the pro-choice
side in public debate, therefore reducing their voice in elections, etc. See also Berry,
supra note 9 (discussing Henderson and the underlying merits of the substantive claim
of viewpoint discrimination).
197. Carolene Prod., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
198. Id.
199. W. V. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (noting that
government should not determine citizens' opinions in "politics, nationalism, religion,
or other matters of opinion," nor "force [them] to confess by word or act their faith
therein."). It is important to reiterate here that standing is a threshold question. The
claim is that the state has not had a neutral viewpoint as is required when it opens up a
forum for political speech. A claim based on competitive advocate standing does not
foreclose the option of the state to argue that there is no limited public forum opened at
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course is available to the political minority via the judicial process
to repair the injury suffered by the plaintiff.
The above point is especially important because opponents of
this conceptualization of the injury might claim that it is an attempt
to find standing in an area in which the legislature, as opposed to
the judiciary, should have the final say.200 Lujan made clear that
the separation of powers principle is inherent in the constitutional
requirement of standing. 201 However, when a court correctly
frames the injury-in-fact utilizing the "competitive advocate stand
ing" model it becomes clear that the "choose-life" specialty plate
cases involve claims that are not in violation of the separation of
powers principle, but rather are about the federal courts' legitimate
power to determine whether a legislature has stepped outside of the
bounds of its power to legislate certain matters. 202 What this option
provides is a loosening of the prudential concerns against genera
lized grievances203 and an accurate application of the redressability
prong of standing. In these cases, and in future cases posing similar
problems, the government should not be allowed to invoke the lack
of standing as a shield just because it stabbed someone in the back
instead of the heart.
CONCLUSION

The "choose-life" specialty plate legislation being enacted
throughout the country runs the risk of drowning out the voices of
pro-choice advocates because it grants pro-life advocates a mega
phone. If courts do not accurately account for the type of injury
alleged in cases involving legislation similar to the "choose-life"
specialty plate legislation, and if courts continue to deny standing, it
all and that this is the speech of the state itself. However, standing is not a mechanism
for deciding the merits of a claim. The aim is to make sure there is an "actual case or
controversy," and that is all. Valley Forge Christian ColI. v. Am. United for Separation
of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 484 (1982) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,99
(1968» (determining that "[t]he requirement of standing 'focuses on the party seeking
to get his complaint before a federal court and not on the issues he wishes to have
adjudicated.' ").
200. See, e.g., Flast, 392 U.S. at 106 (noting courts lack "confidence in [hearing]
cases ... where a taxpayer seeks to employ a federal court ... to air his generalized
grievances about the conduct of government or the allocation of power in the Federal
System").
201. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
202. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (establishing judicial review as the
mechanism for determining when the legislature has stepped outside of its designated
role and acted unconstitutionally).
203. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
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will become possible for legislatures to drown out the voices of any
politically undesirable minority simply by granting benefits to those
individuals whose speech they like. Courts have recognized a form
of standing that allows plaintiffs to challenge statutes they believe
attempt to manipulate public debate by granting benefits to their
adversaries. It is time for the federal judiciary to adopt this stand
ing principle universally in order to keep those legislatures hostile
to the free speech rights of some individuals in the role of policy
makers and out of the role of civil rights breakers.
Layla G. Taylor*
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